“DURING THE TENDER OFFER” OR SOME TIME AROUND IT:
HELPING COURTS INTERPRET THE BEST-PRICE RULE
Michael A. Akiva∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, tender offers have gained appeal as a means of
acquiring corporations. With this development came an increase in regulations
surrounding the tender offer process. Unlike proxy contests, which have long been
subjected to extensive disclosure requirements,1 tender offers were once conducted
with almost complete freedom due to the minimal paperwork necessary to effectuate
the offer.2 In addition, the offeror was able to coerce shareholders into tendering by
threatening to decrease the price offered per share.3 Seeing a need for regulation,
Congress enacted the Williams Act 4 to deal with these problems. The Act was
intended to protect investors from being forced into making hasty decisions by
requiring bidders to publicly disclose information about the tender offer.5
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113 CONG. REC. 854, 855 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams):
[W]here control is sought through a proxy contest, information must be filed under
the Securities Exchange Act which tells shareholders the identity of the participants
and their associates, their stockholdings and when they acquired them, the extent to
which the shares were purchased with borrowed funds and the identity of the
lender if the funds were obtained otherwise than through a bank loan or margin
account.

2

See id. (“But no information need be filed where a cash tender offer is made to stockholders”).

3

Senator Williams noted this situation in his address to Congress. Id. at 856.

Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968). The Act added §§13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
4

5

113 CONG. REC. 854, 856 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
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In the mid-1980s, Congress added the “best price, all-holders” rule to the
Act. 6 Essentially, this addition required all shareholders of the target class to be
treated equally “during [the] tender offer.” 7 However, given the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s and Congress’s reluctance to define the term “tender
offer,”8 the courts have struggled to determine what transactions should be included
in the tender offer.9 This struggle has resulted in a circuit split, with circuits falling
into one of two groups, each endorsing a competing interpretation of the best price
rule. The Ninth Circuit has decided “best price” cases by questioning what
transactions should be included in the tender offer. 10 On the other hand, the
Seventh Circuit has framed the issue by asking when the tender offer occurs.11 In
doing so, the Seventh Circuit looked to the text of other regulations in the Williams
Act and determined that there is a specific start date for tender offers. 12 These
competing interpretations have produced dichotomous judicial consequences. In
subsequent decisions, the Ninth Circuit’s test has been ambiguous and difficult to
apply consistently, whereas the Seventh Circuit’s test has often been too rigid to
allow shareholders a cause of action.
Given that the Williams Act was intended partly to protect investors and
partly to protect the tender offer process,13 this debate has been costly from both the
corporate and the investor perspective. By protecting investors, Congress
presumably meant to allow them free and equal access to information and the open
markets. However, by excluding all transactions that occur before the start of the
tender offer, the Seventh Circuit’s test is easily manipulated and, consequently,
acquiring companies can easily avoid the rule. Conversely, the Ninth Circuit’s test
6

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2005).

7

See § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (2005).

See Note, The Developing Meaning of “Tender Offer” Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1250 (1973) (hereinafter “Developing Meaning”).
8

9

See infra Part III.

10 See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita
Electric Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
11

See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1996).

12

Id. at 245.

13

See infra Part II.1.

2006]

INTERPRETING THE BEST-PRICE RULE

355

does not facilitate or protect the tender offer process because it is too ambiguous to
apply consistently, which results in costly protracted litigation concerning the
motivation behind private transactions between the acquiring company and target
executives.
This divergence between the two circuits stems in part from Congress’s and
the SEC’s reluctance to define a tender offer. The Ninth Circuit tried to define the
term but did so in a piecemeal fashion, incorporating only those transactions
occurring in the case before it. The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, tried to
clarify what the Act already made clear; namely when a tender offer begins. The
question of when a tender offer begins, however, seems moot when looking at the
text and legislative history of the Williams Act. Because both Circuits have done an
imperfect job in interpreting Rule 14d-10, judicial resolution of this matter seems
unlikely, and either the SEC or Congress should intervene.
Section II of this article discusses the Williams Act and the history of the
“best price, all-holders” rule. Section III discusses the split that arose from the Act’s
ambiguity. Section IV addresses the problems with the current judicial tests and
discusses a recent district court decision that some feel has provided clarity to the
application of those tests. Section V recommends more clarity, not in drawing dates,
but by defining what a tender offer is and creating a safe harbor so that bidders and
investors know what is permissible under the Act.
II. THE WILLIAMS ACT AMENDMENTS TO THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
A. The Williams Act Amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Williams Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding,
among other regulations, section 14(d).14 In doing so, Congress intended to “close a
significant gap in investor protection.”15 However, Senator Williams maintained that
the Act “balance[d] the scales equally to protect the legitimate interests of the
corporation, management, and shareholders.”16 As such, the goals of the Act were
14

Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968).

15

113 CONG. REC. 854, 851 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).

Id. See also 33 S.E.C. Docket 762, Release No. 6,595 (July 1, 1985) (stating that “[i]n implementing
this policy of neutrality, the [Securities and Exchange] Commission has administered the Williams Act
in an even-handed fashion favoring neither side in a contest”).

16
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twofold. First, the Act aimed to increase investor protection by informing investors
about the merits of tender offers.17 Before the Act, acquiring companies were not
required to disclose important information about the tender offer to target
shareholders. In addition, they were able to coerce shareholders into tendering their
shares by structuring tender offers so that the shareholders would have insufficient
time to evaluate what little information they were given.18 By ordering bidders to
disclose all relevant information to shareholders and give shareholders at least twenty
days to examine these materials, the Act gave shareholders time to make a more
informed, less hasty decision.
Second, the Act was concerned with protecting the tender offer process.19
Observing that tender offers serve important business functions, Senator Williams
took “extreme care…to balance the scales equally” so that he would not “unduly
imped[e] cash takeover bids.”20 The Act thus aimed to provide businesses with some
certainty in the tender offer process by demarcating when the tender offer begins
and what information must be disclosed to shareholders when making a bid. 21
1. The Best-Price, All-Holders Amendment
In 1985, the Securities and Exchange Commission recommended amending
the Williams Act.22 In administering the Williams Act, the SEC had implicitly read
into the Act the requirements that the bidder “make a tender offer to all security
holders…and that the offer be made to all holders on the same terms.”23 Upon the
SEC’s recommendations that these requirements be formalized, Congress enacted
17

113 CONG. REC. 854, 851.

For instance, the acquiring companies would buy shares on a first-come, first-served basis. This put
pressure on shareholders to tender so that they would not forego the premium offered by the bidder.
See 113 CONG. REC. 854, 856. To address this problem, the Act requires a bidder to buy shares on a
pro rata basis if shareholders tender more shares than the bidder requested. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8
(2005).
18

19

113 CONG. REC. 854, 851.

Id. (“In some instances, a change in management will prove a welcome boon for shareholder and
employee”).

20

21

See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-2(a), 240.14d-3 (2005).

22

33 S.E.C. Docket 762, Release No. 6,595 (July 1, 1985).

23

Id. (emphasis added).
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Rule 14d-10.24 It believed this rule, also known as the “best-price, all-holders rule,”
was necessary to fully achieve investor protection and implement the Act because it
“expressly preclude[s] bidders from discriminating among holders of the class of
securities that is the subject of the offer.”25
There are two main provisions within Rule 14d-10: the “all-holders”
provision and the “best-price” provision. Without the former provision, the
disclosure requirements of the Williams Act would be useless because a bidder could
solicit shares from only a few select shareholders without offering information to all
shareholders. 26 “Such discriminatory tender offers could result in the abuses
inherent in ‘Saturday Night Specials,’ [or] ‘First-Come First Served’ offers…since
security holders who are excluded from the offer may be pressured to sell to those in
the included class in order to participate.”27 The “best price” provision was enacted
because the Williams Act was silent on the topic of consideration. Therefore, a
bidder could make an offer to all shareholders, but at different prices. One specific
and growing problem was the “two-tiered, coercive tender offer,” also known as the
“First-Come First Served” offer. This type of tender offer is distinguishable from
general tender offers by the fact that the bidder breaks up the acquisition into two
parts; the first is a tender offer at one price per share, and the second is a subsequent
short-form merger at a lower price per share. As a result, the value of the initial
tender offer is higher than the value a shareholder would receive if he or she did not
tender at that time. This type of tender offer coerces a shareholder into tendering
because
[e]ven a shareholder who is convinced that the initial premium is too
low will tender for fear that other…shareholders will tender leaving
her, if the takeover succeeds, with the inferior back-end position of a
nontendering shareholder. The greater the difference between the

24

17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2005).

25

36 S.E.C. Docket 96, Release No. 6,653 (July 11, 1986).

The all-holders requirement of rule 14d-10 reads, “No bidder shall make a tender offer
unless…[t]he tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of securities subject to the tender
offer.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(1) (2005).
26

27

36 S.E.C. Docket 96, Release No. 6,653 (July 11, 1986).
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front-end premium and the back-end position, the greater the
potential cost to nontendering shareholders.28
The best-price provision was intended to remedy that legislative gap by requiring a
bidder to offer the same consideration to all shareholders.29
Courts have interpreted the best-price provision, Rule 14d-10(a)(2), as having
four elements: “(1) that the bidder, (2) during the pendency of the bidder’s tender
offer, (3) purchased a security that is the subject of the tender offer, (4) for more
consideration than the bidder paid to other shareholders pursuant to the tender
offer.” 30 Essentially, the best-price and all-holders amendments 31 were added in
order to further the Act’s purpose of investor protection by requiring full disclosure
and uniform treatment among investors. One noteworthy aspect of the best-price
rule is that, as it currently stands, it only allows actions against the acquiring
corporation, not the target company or target executives. Therefore, the
shareholders’ only recourse is to sue the bidding company if they believe they were
offered a lesser amount than other shareholders.
III. BEST PRICE JURISPRUDENCE: THE INTERPRETIVE DEBATE
Although the law surrounding tender offers has developed over the past
forty years, Congress has not yet defined the term “tender offer.” 32 Before the
adoption of the best-price rule, courts faced the problem of determining what
transactions were covered by the Act by defining what constituted a tender offer.33
28 Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 117, 127 (1986).

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (2005) (“The consideration paid to any security holder pursuant to
the tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security holder during such tender
offer”).
29

30

Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2001).

31

This Comment will refer to both provisions as the “best price rule.”

32 See Developing Meaning, supra note 8. The author discusses four possible definitions of the term
“tender offer” and argues that an offer to buy another corporation should be defined as a tender offer
if it is “found capable of exerting the same sort of pressure on shareholders to make uninformed, illconsidered decisions to sell which Congress found the conventional tender offer was capable of
exerting.” Id. at 1275. This definition, the author argues, advances the purposes of the Williams Act
better than the more restrictive alternatives. Id.
33

See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir. 1995).
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The problem courts face today involves interpreting the phrase “during such tender
offer.”34 This situation has led to ambiguous results because some courts have tried
to determine what transactions are included “during” the tender offer period by
defining the term “tender offer,” while other courts leave the term undefined. 35
Consequently, the courts are now in an “interpretive dichotomy,”36 with one group
of circuits interpreting the Rule to include transactions entered into before the
commencement of the tender offer 37 and the other group arguing that any
transaction that occurs outside the tender offer period cannot be included in the
tender offer.38
A. The “Integral Part” Test
The Ninth Circuit adopted the former, broader interpretation in Epstein v.
MCA, Inc.,39 which involved the acquisition of MCA by Matsushita Electrical Co.,
Ltd. (“Matsushita”) for $71 per share.40 The target shareholders brought suit against
MCA and Matsushita when they learned of a series of transactions that enriched two
executive stockholders of MCA (Lew Wasserman, MCA’s chief executive officer,
and Sidney Sheinberg, MCA’s chief operating officer).41 At the time of the offer,
Wasserman owned approximately five million shares.42 Rather than tendering those
shares at the offer price, he entered into a separate agreement under which he traded
34

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (2005).

35 See, e.g., Epstein, 50 F.3d at 654; Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1996). In
Epstein, suit was brought against the target company, MCA. The suit was later dropped because Rule
14d-10 holds only the bidder liable for violations. See 17 C.F.R. §240.14d-10(a) (2005).
36 Rusty A. Fleming, A Case of “When” Rather than “What:” Tender Offers Under the Williams Act and the
All Holders and Best Price Rules, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 266 (2003).
37

Epstein, 50 F.3d at 655.

38

Lerro, 84 F.3d at 246.

39

50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995).

40 Id. at 647. The offer price consisted of $66 in cash and $5 in stock of WWOR-TV, a spin-off
company of MCA. Id. at 647 n.1.
41

Id. at 648.

42

Id. at 647.
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his shares for preferred stock in a subsidiary company of Matsushita, MEA
Holdings.43 In the agreement, Matsushita was to fund MEA Holdings with 106% of
the tender price multiplied by the number of shares Wasserman exchanged.44 The
MEA shares would pay Wasserman an annual dividend of 8.75% and were intended
to be a tax-free exchange of Wasserman’s MCA stock.45 .
The Sheinberg transaction allegedly involved the tendering of MCA shares at
a premium. 46 At the time of the tender offer, Sheinberg owned approximately a
million shares, which he tendered at the $71 per share offer.47 However, unlike the
general shareholders, he received an additional $21 million dollars, which was
ostensibly paid to cash out Sheinberg’s unexercised stock options.48
The Ninth Circuit noted that it had no Congressional guidance or judicial
precedent for determining whether either transaction should be considered a part of
the tender offer. 49 Thus, it turned to the administrative history of the Rule and
found that “the SEC emphasized the need for ‘equality of treatment among all
shareholders who tender their shares.’” 50 The Court also found that the SEC
thought the Rule necessary to realize the “investor protection purpose of the
[Securities Exchange Act of 1934] and the Williams Act.”51 With this in mind, it
explicitly rejected the defendant’s timing argument, which the Seventh Circuit would
later adopt.52 Essentially, the defendants’ proposed timing test commences a tender
43

Id. at 647-48.

44

Id. at 648.

Id; see also I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006). This transaction provided Wasserman with more compensation
than participating in the tender offer.
45

46

Epstein, 50 F.3d at 648.

47

Id.

48 Id. The purpose of the $21 million dollar payment is disputed. See infra text accompanying notes
67-68.
49

Id. at 654.

50

Id. at 655 (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-550, at 10 (1967)).

51

Id. at 655.

52 Id. The Seventh Circuit adopted this test in Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 243-44 (7th Cir.
1996).
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offer under the guidelines of Rule 14d-2 at 12:01 a.m. on either the date the tender
offer is publicly announced or the date it is sent to the shareholders, whichever
comes first. 53 Any transaction that fell before that date or after the close of the
tender offer would be considered outside the tender offer period and, thus, outside
the scope of the rule.54
The Ninth Circuit rejected this test because it “would drain Rule 14d-10 of
all its force.” 55 The Court then proposed a different inquiry: “whether the
Wasserman transaction was an integral part of Matsushita’s tender offer.” 56 The
Ninth Circuit gives little guidance on how to determine what transactions are to be
included in the tender offer.57 The Ninth Circuit noted that courts have applied a
“functional test,” 58 which is a fact-specific and fact-intensive inquiry that deems a
transaction part of the tender offer if it served an integral part of it.59 For instance, a
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (2005) (“A bidder will have commenced its tender offer for purposes of
section 14(d) of the Act…and the rules under that section at 12:01 a.m. on the date when the bidder
has first published, sent or given the means to tender to security holders”).
53

54

Epstein, 50 F.3d at 655.

55

Id. As an example of the injustice the rule would serve, the Court stated,
Under Matsushita’s reading, even the most blatantly discriminatory tender offer – in
which large shareholders were paid twice as much as small shareholders – would
fall outside Rule 14d-10’s prohibition, so long as the bidder waited a few seconds
after it accepted all of the tendered shares before paying the favored shareholders.
Id.

56

Id.

57 Id. at 656. The only guidance given by the Ninth Circuit was quoted from the Second Circuit,
which stated that whether a transaction “is part of the tender offer for purposes of the Act cannot be
determined by rubber-stamping the label used by the acquiror.” Id. (quoting Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d
938, 944 (2d Cir. 1988)).
58

Hereinafter referred to as the “Integral Part Test.”

59

See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 655-56:
An inquiry more in keeping with the language and purposes of Rule 14d-10 focuses
not on when Wasserman was paid, but on whether the Wasserman transaction was
an integral part of Matsushita’s tender offer. If it was, Matsushita violated Rule
14d-10 because it paid him…different, and perhaps more valuable consideration
than it offered to other shareholders. Id.
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transaction that is conditional on the success of the tender offer will likely be an
integral part of the tender offer.60
On that basis, the Court concluded that the Wasserman transaction was part
of the tender offer because the terms of the agreement were conditioned on the
success of the offer.61 With respect to the Sheinberg payment, the parties alleged two
different motives behind the transaction. The plaintiffs argued that the payment was
a premium “designed to induce Sheinberg to tender his shares.”62 If so, then under
the Ninth Circuit’s functional test, it would likely be a part of the tender offer.
However, the defendants argued that the $21 million Sheinberg received was
“designed both to cash out stock options…and to compensate Sheinberg for
agreeing to amend his employment contract with MCA.” 63 Given the conflicting
accounts, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendant’s summary judgment motion.64
B. The “Bright Line” Rule
The Seventh Circuit adopted a different test to determine whether a specific
transaction should be included in the tender offer period. Confronted by Snapple
investors, who argued that a major shareholder was given additional consideration,
the Seventh Circuit rejected the integral part test in its decision in Lerro v. Quaker Oats
Co. 65 The case concerned a tender offer and a subsequent merger agreement
between Quaker Oats Company and Snapple.66 Before Quaker would enter into a
merger agreement with Snapple, it required Snapple to enter into an exclusive
distributorship agreement with Select Beverages, Inc. (“Select”).67 The conflict arose
Id. at 656 (“Because the terms of the Wasserman Capital Contribution and Loan Agreement were in
several material respects conditioned on the terms of the public tender offer, we can only conclude
that the Wasserman transaction was an integral part of the offer”).
60

61

Id. at 656.

62

Id. at 657.

63

Id.

64 Id. at 658. After this case, the Ninth Circuit will deem transactions conditioned on the success of
the tender offer and premiums designed to induce tendering to be part of the tender offer.
65

84 F.3d 239, 240, 246 (7th Cir. 1996).

66

Id. at 240. The tender offer was $14 cash for a share of Snapple stock.

67

Id.
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because a major stockholder of Snapple, the Thomas H. Lee Company (“Lee”), held
20 percent of Select’s common stock.68 Consequently, the plaintiffs argued that the
agreement with Select provided Lee additional compensation for his Snapple
shares.69
The plaintiffs contended that the Seventh Circuit should adopt the Ninth
Circuit’s functional test.70 However, the Court rejected their argument, stating that
the case was about “when” as opposed to “what.”71 The Court drew this distinction
because Epstein’s functional test tries to determine what a tender offer is by
determining what transactions should be included.72 The Seventh Circuit stated that
this determination was irrelevant because the time period for a tender offer is
“rigorously defined.” 73 The Williams Act is filled with timetables that require
companies to file forms and schedules once a tender offer commences.74 According
to the Seventh Circuit, the Integral Part Test would make the start and end dates for
a tender offer uncertain by allowing courts to make ex ante judicial determinations of
what transaction started the tender offer.75 As a result, the Court argued that the
Integral Part Test would subvert both the investor protection and clarity purposes of
the Williams Act.76

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

See id. at 245.

71

Id. at 246.

72

See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir. 1995).

73

Lerro, 84 F.3d at 246.

74

Id; see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-3, 240.14d-4, 240.14d-6 (2005).

Lerro, 84 F.3d at 246. The Court argued that the Integral Part Test would “wreak havoc” because
the clocks could not be known until “years after the events, [when] a judge declares when negotiations
became sufficiently serious to mark the commencement of the offer.” Id.

75

Id. at 243. The purpose of Rule 14d-10 “is to demark clearly the periods during which the special
Williams Act rules apply.” Id.
76
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On that basis, the Seventh Circuit contended that best-price cases are about
when the tender offer begins.77 The Court noted that the tender offer starts at 12:01
a.m. on the date of general publication for purposes of Rule 14(d) of the Act.78 The
Court then looked at the text of Rule 14d-10 and held that, because Congress used
the phrase “during the tender offer,” it wanted to cover only those transactions
occurring within the tender offer period, not before or after. 79 Noting that the
Supreme Court has mandated deference to securities statutes and regulations, the
Seventh Circuit believed that a bright line rule rejecting those transactions that occur
outside the tender offer period would be most in accordance with the text of the
statute. 80 The court believed that this line, drawn by Congress, was a strict, but
necessary, rule because “[i]t is essential to permit everyone to participate in the
markets near the time of a tender offer.”81 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit’s rule
absolves all transactions outside the tender offer period from liability.
IV. CURRENT PROBLEMS
As it now stands, investors are left with two rules, both purporting to protect
them, yet both doing an imperfect job. This section discusses the problems with
both tests. It then discusses one case in particular, Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Inc., 82
that has been particularly influential in the best-price debate. Specifically, the case is
said to clarify the application of the best-price rule to private transactions around the
time of the tender offer.83 However, this section discusses why that case does not
77

Id. at 246.

78

Id. For a summary of the text of Rule 14d-2, see supra text accompanying note 30.

Lerro, 84 F. 3d at 243; see also, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (2005) (“The consideration paid to any
security holder pursuant to the tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security
holder during such tender offer”) (emphasis added).

79

80 Lerro, 84 F.3d at 243 (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995); Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)) (Courts are to “respect the language of the securities statutes
and regulations”).
81 Id. The Court explained, “Bidders are forbidden to buy or sell on the open market or via negotiated
transactions during an offer…but they are free to transact until an offer begins, or immediately after it
ends.” Id.
82

Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 841 (M.D. Tenn. 2003).

83 See Christopher E. Austin & Justin S. Anand, Federal Court Clarifies the Application of the “Best Price
Rule,” 6 M&A LAW. 10 (2003).
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clarify best-price jurisprudence, but instead adds more confusion to an already
muddled problem.
A. Problems with Best-Price Jurisprudence
Although the Williams Act was enacted for two purposes, both the Ninth
and Seventh Circuits’ tests seem to frustrate at least one of those purposes. In
Epstein, the Ninth Circuit focuses only on the fact that the Williams Act was
promulgated to protect investors. 84 The Court seemed to believe that creating a
broad rule would best advance that objective. 85 However, its subjective factual
investigation makes it difficult for bidders and corporations to predict when a tender
offer period begins and ends, thus making the process murky.86 The Epstein holding
provides no clear results for future cases87
This ambiguity deters bidders from making tender offers, hurts both
investors and corporations, and disregards Senator Williams’ intentions. In his
address to Congress, Senator Williams stated that “[t]his measure is not aimed at
obstructing legitimate takeover bids,” because he recognized that tender offers may
be necessary for a company’s survival.88 For instance, tender offers can be a useful
mechanism for achieving efficiency and growth by fighting against entrenched and
84

Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 655 (9th Cir. 1995).

85

Id.

See id. at 656 n.19 (stating that if a private agreement “is deemed a part of the tender offer, the
tender offer does not end, by definition, until that agreement is performed”); see also supra notes 56-59
and accompanying text.
86

87 See Fleming, supra note 36, at 290-91 (the Integral Part Test “impact[s] practitioners, acquiring
corporations, and target corporations leading to confusion in deciding how the tests will be applied”);
see also Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (rejecting “the
Ninth Circuit’s broad holding, which requires a subjective analysis of transactions occurring outside
the tender offer period to determine if they should be deemed ‘integral’ to the tender offer.”); Mark
Khmelnitskiy, Structuring Transactions Outside All Holders/Best Price Rule, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
501, 515 (2004) (stating that even though the Ninth Circuit allows courts to scrutinize transactions on
an individual basis, it “failed to articulate any definite factors that would distinguish legitimate
transactions from mere efforts to escape Rule 14d-10”); John Mueller, The “All-Holder-Best Price” Rule:
Executive Compensation Agreements and Their Place in Tender Offers,” 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 287, 303
(2003) (arguing that “the test is completely void of structure and, thus, fails to establish any discernible
guidelines for future tender offers”).
88

113 CONG. REC. 854, 851 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).

366

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 7

inefficient managers. 89 In addition, bidders often wage bidding wars against one
another to buy a target’s shares, which can yield higher premiums for target
shareholders.90 Deterring tender offers has the potential to deter multiple bids for
corporations, thereby resulting in lower premiums to target shareholders. This can
be especially detrimental for the target shareholders because this decrease may be
replaced with an increase in mergers. 91 It is doubtful that Senator Williams or
Congress ever intended these negative effects.
Additionally, the subjectivity of the Ninth Circuit’s test might spur protracted
litigation that is costly for the bidding company. In fact, most courts that have
adopted this test have rejected a defendant’s summary judgment motion. 92 As a
result, these cases proceeded to discovery, costing companies valuable time and
money. Although courts are trying to protect investors, such litigation is harmful
when considering that many of these suits concern legitimate business agreements93
See THOMAS HOLLIS HOPKINS, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND DIVESTITURES: A GUIDE TO THEIR
IMPACT FOR INVESTORS AND DIRECTORS 14 (1983) (stating that replacing “incompetent management
by the competent is another classic justification for acquisitions”); William C. Tyson, The Proper
Relationship Between Federal and State Law in the Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 241,
251 (1990). Recognizing this fact, Congress resisted any bias in favor of target management. S. REP.
NO. 90-550, at 3 (1967).
89

90 See Tyson, supra note 89, at n.48 (writing that “Congress also was convinced that tender offers
fostered competitive bidding for target stock, thus affording target shareholders the opportunity to
tender their shares at a premium”) (citing 113 CONG. REC. 24, 666 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits)).
Regardless of whether there is a bidding war, however, target shareholders experience positive returns
on their shares from tender offers. A study done by Michael Jensen and Richard Ruback found that,
on average, shareholders gained between 16.9 and 34.1 percent return on their shares for successful
tender offers. Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific
Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 8 (1983).
91 Empirical evidence suggests that target shareholders gain about 10 percent more in a tender offer
than in a merger. See David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 153, 175 (1986).
92 See Gerber v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 303 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2002); Karlin v. Alcatel, S.A., No.
SA CV 00-0214 DOC EE, 2001 WL 1301216 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2001); Maxick v. Cadence Design
Sys., Inc., No. C-00-0658-PJ-H, 2000 WL 33174386 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2000); Millionerrors Inv.
Club v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. Civ.A. 99-781, 2000 WL 1288333 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2000); Padilla v.
Medpartners, Inc., No. CV 98-1092-RSWL, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22839 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 1998);
Perera v. Chiron Corp., No. C-95-20725 SW, 1996 WL 251936 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1996) (denying in
part and granting in part defendant’s summary judgment motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim that
insiders received additional consideration). But see Harris v. Intel Corp., No. C 00-1528 CW, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13796 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2002) (granting defendant’s summary judgment motion).

For instance, both Karlin and Millionerrors Investment Club concerned the target board of director’s
decision to grant two executives stock options around the time of the tender offer. See Karlin, 2001
93
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that companies use to recognize a manager’s accomplishments. 94 By hindering a
company’s efforts at recognition, courts may make it more difficult for the company
to obtain and retain quality management. Golden parachutes in particular are useful
and often necessary to keep a target company’s executives from seeking another
position during the course of a takeover. 95 During times of transition, it is
particularly important to have strong management to keep a company stable. In
addition, volatile industries can use golden parachutes to attract quality
management.96 On the other hand, many scholars have criticized the use of golden
parachutes as a means of serving executive greed97 and have characterized them as
corporate “waste.”98 However, the vast majority of scholars are in agreement that
reasonable golden parachutes can be useful and desirable from both the corporate
and investor perspectives.99 Consequently, a broad, subjective rule that judges these
agreements on a case-by-case basis may interfere with legitimate corporate needs by
making companies more reluctant to draft these agreements. Surely neither Senator
Williams nor Congress intended this result.
Although the Seventh Circuit attempted to clarify the best-price rule by
creating an unambiguous test, its test does not accomplish what Senator Williams set
WL 1301216, at *2; Millionerrors, 2000 WL 1288333, at *1; see also Padilla, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22839, at *3 (concerning a golden parachute incentive agreement that the target company enacted for
its executives).
Golden parachutes, or “change-in-control severance agreement plans,” provide top executives with
compensation when they leave or are fired from a company that has been taken over. HENRY R.
CHEESEMAN, BUSINESS LAW: THE LEGAL, ETHICAL, AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 784 (4th
ed. 2001).
94

95

Id.

See Richard P. Bress, Note, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 959
(1987); Kenneth C. Johnson, Note Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper
Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909, 917 (1985) (arguing that without a golden parachute agreement,
“executives may hesitate to invest their human capital in corporations that require the acquisition of a
great deal of firm-specific knowledge and experience, because such knowledge and experience cannot
be transferred if the executives are displaced by a takeover”).

96

97

See Johnson, supra note 96, at 917.

98

See Bress, supra note 96, at 961.

99

See id. at 979; Johnson, supra note 96, at 917.
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out to do.100 The Court argued that setting a clear date upon which all transactions
would be considered “during” the tender offer would protect both investors and
corporations.101 However, the benefits seem one-sided. First and foremost, the test
creates a win-win situation for bidders. Under it, a bidder is allowed to pay an insider or
major shareholder a premium for tendering his or her shares so long as this payment
occurs outside the tender offer period. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s rule
contains no restriction on conditioning transactions on the success of the tender
offer. As a result, a bidder can give an insider or shareholder a premium to gain
support for the tender offer but later recoup the payment if the tender offer fails to
meet its threshold.102 The Court urges that this situation is acceptable because Rule
14d-2 specifies when the tender offer clock begins and thus defines what
transactions should be included in the tender offer period.103 But this, too, misses
the purpose of the Williams Act, which was “meant to have a substantial remedial
component, a significant substantive dimension, and strong preemptive force.”104 As
it stands, the Seventh Circuit’s test does not provide shareholders with a suitable
means of suing bidders who allegedly violate the best-price rule because the brightline test dismisses all transactions that occur outside the tender offer period—if a
transaction occurred outside the tender offer period, the Seventh Circuit would grant
summary judgment for the defendant. 105 However, such a rule allows for easy
manipulation and maneuvering around the test so that otherwise illegal transactions
could escape judicial scrutiny.106 For instance, a bidder could negotiate payments
See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Mueller, supra note 90, at
304-05 (stating that the Seventh Circuit “recognized that the approach was rather mechanical, but
held that the critical need for certainty in the regulation of tender offers justified its use”).
100

101

Lerro, 84 F.3d at 243.

102 See id. (stating that “[p]ersons who make tender offers do not lose their ability to participate as
investors for undefined periods ‘near’ the time of the offer”). This seems unfair to outside
stockholders given the remedial nature of the best-price rule.
103 Id. at 246; see also supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit’s test merely
interprets and formalizes the text of Rule 14d-2 into case law.
104

Tyson, supra note 89, at 353.

105 Lerro, 84 F.3d at 246 (“[O]ur case is about ‘when’ rather than ‘what.’ Quaker Oats made a
traditional tender offer. The commencement is rigorously defined. This offer commenced at 12:01
A.M. on November 4, 1994…. From this conclusion everything else follows”).
106 See Fleming, supra note 36 at 292 (offering examples of how creative business people can structure
transactions outside the Seventh Circuit’s rule. For instance, they can demand terms “in an
employment or incentive agreement that become cost prohibitive for a potential bidder” or offer
lower premiums if the bidder is forced to enter into expensive employment agreements with insiders).
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with inside executives before the start of the tender offer and pay them after the
tender offer succeeds. This could result in lower overall premiums paid to outside
investors.107
Moreover, the Court argued that paying a premium to insider shareholders at
the expense of outside investors is permissible because it is better than the
alternative—a doomed tender offer. 108 For instance, the Court maintained that a
transaction where general investors receive $25 per share and inside investors receive
$30 per share for stock worth $22 is permissible.109 This begs the question: what
protects investors? If we assume that by protecting investors, Senator Williams and
Congress intended to maximize a shareholder’s return on his or her investment, then
the Seventh Circuit has failed to advance this goal.110 By permitting a situation in
which an investor receives less than his or her entitlement, the Seventh Circuit has
hurt, rather than protected, the investor, a situation that the Williams Act was
intended to remedy.111
Allowing the payment of premiums to only one shareholder or a group of
shareholders has another indirect effect. Senator Williams’ address to Congress
shows that the Act was passed in part to better inform investors. 112 However, by
permitting premiums to be paid to target executives, the Seventh Circuit has
indirectly stifled the disclosure of information to shareholders because those
executives will be less inclined to voice opposition to the tender offer. Because they
will be less likely to give counterarguments to outside shareholders, the rule will bias

107 For instance, if a company whose stock is trading at $22 per share is valued at $25 per share by the
bidder, and the insiders receive a premium of $5 on their shares, then the outside shareholders will
have to accept a price lower than $25 per share because giving them that price per share would raise
the total spent on the target above its projected value. Outside shareholders will thus be forced into
either tendering at a lower price or not tendering at all.
108

Lerro, 84 F.3d at 243.

109

See id.

110

See Fleming, supra note 36, at 279.

See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. Senator Williams intended on closing “a significant
gap in investor protection.” 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).

111

112

See 113 CONG. REC. 854, 855 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
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the disclosures to only pro-tender offer information. Consequently, investors might
end up tendering their shares when it is not in their best interests to do so.113
B. Discussion and Critique of Katt—Why the Middle District of Tennessee
Has Not Solved the “Best-Price” Debate
Since Lerro and Epstein, many 14d-10 cases have been brought by disgruntled
investors—including Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Inc. 114 Heard by a district court in
Tennessee, this case concerned United Technologies Corporation’s (“UTC”)
fulfillment of International Comfort Products’ (“ICP”) golden parachute agreements
with insider shareholders.115 The plaintiffs were a group of outside stockholders in
ICP.116 After a decline in the early 1990’s, ICP hired new managers to revitalize the
company.117 As part of its efforts, the board adopted an executive compensation
plan and incentive strategy that was based on management performance.118 The plan
included golden parachute agreements that “guaranteed between 12 and 24 months
of salary and benefits in the event of a change in control.”119 The board adopted this
plan in 1997 and considered revising it in 1998, but the revision ultimately did not
take place. 120 As the company became profitable, two of its largest shareholders
considered selling their stock.121 In response, the board decided to sell the company
in the beginning of 1999.122

For instance, because of the additional premiums to target executives, outside investors might
receive a substantially smaller premium on their shares than that to which they are entitled.
113

114

244 F. Supp. 2d 841 (M.D. Tenn. 2003).

115

Id. at 846-47.

116

Id. at 843.

117

Id. at 846.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id.
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With the aid of Credit Suisse First Boston (“CSFB”), the company contacted
about forty potential bidders.123 While CSFB was discussing potential takeovers with
the bidders, the ICP board reviewed its executives’ golden parachute agreements and
decided to provide its senior managers with additional benefits. 124 The new
agreements extended each severance period by one year, extended benefits by a year,
added a bonus component to the salary calculation, and accelerated unvested
options.125 Plaintiffs estimated the value of these agreements at about $11 million.126
Plaintiffs argued that these agreements were approved in order to provide ICP
executives with additional consideration for their shares from the company’s ultimate
acquirer.127
In June, three companies submitted binding bids, and the defendant UTC
was the highest bidder at $11.25 per share.128 After subsequent negotiations with
CSFB, UTC agreed to increase its bid to $11.75 per share. 129 UTC’s subsidiary,
Titan, commenced the tender offer on June 30, 1999, when it filed its statement with
the SEC.130
Before the tender offer period, however, UTC negotiated additional service
agreements with ten ICP executives, entitling them to bonuses ranging from $50,000
for junior executives to $500,000 for the CEO, provided that the executive worked
123

Id. at 847.

124

Id.

125

Id. The revision took place in March 1999.

Id. This figure is the value that the revised agreements added in excess of the original severance
agreements.
126

127

Id.

128

Id. at 848.

129 Id. This provided shareholders with a 65 percent premium over the January 1999 stock price, and
a 37.4 percent premium over the average stock price for the three-month period prior to that date. Id.
UTC entered into a pre-acquisition agreement with ICP that detailed a two-tiered transaction. First,
UTC would offer $11.75 per share to ICP shareholders. Then, if UTC acquired at least 71 percent of
ICP stock, it would merge with ICP using a short-form merger, acquiring the remaining shares at the
tender offer price. Id.
130

Id. at 849.
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ninety days after the acquisition and used his or her best efforts to assist in the
transition.131 These bonuses were all contingent on the success of the tender offer:
if UTC was not successful in acquiring 71 percent of ICP stock, management would
not receive these bonuses.132 Ultimately however, UTC’s tender offer was successful,
and the company acquired 98 percent of ICP’s stock.133
The plaintiffs contended that these agreements provided the executives with
compensation for work they were already required to do—namely, manage the
company.134 As such, they alleged that the service agreements were nothing more
than additional compensation to ICP management to induce them to tender their
shares and to solicit other shareholders to tender shares of ICP. 135 Defendants
argued that these agreements were legitimate compensation for work done during
the transition and denied any allegations that they were intended as additional
compensation for their shares.136
Given that the service agreements were negotiated and executed outside the
tender offer period, the district court framed this case in terms of what interpretation
best conforms with Congress’s and the SEC’s views on the best-price rule.137 The
Court rejected Epstein’s Integral Part Test because it found “‘no language in the
administrative or legislative history supporting the expansive reading of…Rule 14(d)10 [sic].’” 138 Consequently, the Court applied Lerro to the facts of the case and
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 139 With respect to the
131 Id. Plaintiffs argue that in exchange for the bonuses, ICP executives were to “cooperate fully with
[UTC] on all matters required to bring the [tender offer] to closing and successfully solicit ICP
shareholders.” Id.
132

Id.

133

Id.

134

Id. at 850.

135

Id. at 849-50.

136

Id. at 850.

137

Id.

138 Id. at 854 (quoting Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1376 (N.D. Ga.
2001)).
139

Id. at 856.
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golden parachute agreements, the court noted that they “occurred after the tender
offer had expired.”140 Because Lerro’s rule dismisses agreements that occur outside
the tender offer period, the court rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on these agreements as
evidence of a discrepancy in payment. 141 With respect to the transition service
agreements, the Court granted summary judgment for the defendants because the
plaintiffs did not provide evidence to show a genuine issue concerning the fourth
element of Rule 14d-10.142 The court asserted that the plaintiffs’ argument boiled
down to an argument about “waste;” essentially that the payments were only to
compensate the executives for work done during the transaction and those payments
were unnecessary because the target company was already compensating the
executives for that work.143 However, the Court rejected this argument not because
it was wrong, but because “question[s] of business judgment and corporate law
[were] beyond the scope of this lawsuit.”144
In dicta, the court attempted to clarify how Epstein’s Integral Part Test should
apply to best-price cases.145 It should be noted that the Court accepted the Lerro test
and rejected Epstein’s test, applying and elucidating the Ninth Circuit’s “malleable
standard” only “in the interests of clarity and comprehensiveness.”146 In proceeding,
the Court contended that under Epstein, a plaintiff cannot successfully argue that an
agreement was integral to the tender offer merely because it was conditional upon
the success of the offer.147 Rather, the Court stated that this inquiry, as to whether
the agreement was conditional, “is only one part of the Best Price Rule inquiry.”148
140

Id. at 857.

141

Id.

142 Id. at 859. The fourth element reads “for more consideration than the bidder paid to other
shareholders pursuant to the tender offer.” See supra text accompanying note 30.
143

Katt, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 859-60.

144

Id. at 859.

145

See id. at 857-60.

146

Id. at 857.

147

Id.

148

Id.
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Another part of the inquiry requires the plaintiff to show that the agreement was
intended to be additional consideration above the tender offer price in order to
induce the executive to tender his or her shares and support the offer.149 Therefore,
Katt rejected the notion that a conditional payment raises the presumption of an
intent to induce the executives to tender. The court requires the plaintiffs to show
more than a conditional payment, thus making it more difficult for plaintiffs to
defeat summary judgment. Additionally, in order to show a violation of the bestprice rule, Katt required that the payment made to the executive shareholder not be
the acquiror’s merely honoring a pre-existing duty of the target,150 a condition Epstein
never stipulated.151
For the above reasons—namely, its “clarification” of Epstein and its adoption
of Lerro—Katt is viewed as a clarification of the best-price rule. 152 Scholars have
advanced three arguments in favor of this case. First, the adoption of Lerro is helpful
because it joined many other courts applying the bright-line test, reversing an earlier
decision in the same case.153 As such, it provides additional support for moving away
from the Integral Part Test. 154 Second, the court clarified the application of the
Integral Part Test by requiring a plaintiff to prove that the bidder intended to induce
target executives to tender.155 Finally, the Court determined that a bidder “does not
violate the best price rule as a matter of law, even under the Integral Part Test, by
simply honoring preexisting golden parachutes and other contracts inherited from

149

Id. at 857-58.

Id. at 858. “[U]nder Epstein, Plaintiff could defeat summary judgment on its claim that the golden
parachutes violated the Williams Act only by alleging sufficient facts to establish a question whether
UTC was involved in the ICP Board’s adoption of the agreements.” Id. Therefore, payments made
according to an agreement negotiated solely within the target company do not violate Rule 14d-10.
150

151 Id. at 859. “Epstein itself lends little support to Plaintiff’s case, given in that case, the acquiror
consulted with the target and expressly approved its grant of new stock options to a dominant
shareholder on the day the tender offer was announced.” Id.
152

See Austin & Anand, supra note 83, at 10.

153

Id.

154

Id.

155

Id.
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the target.” 156 As a result, a plaintiff must show that the bidder was involved in
enacting the agreements.157
Katt, however, does nothing more than increase support for Lerro by
adopting its test. This does not make the test more accurate or correct—just more
popular. In addition, the Court really does not clarify the application of Epstein’s
Integral Part Test. By requiring the plaintiffs to show the bidder’s intentions behind
making payments to target executives, Katt makes Epstein’s broad test even harder to
apply. As it stands, Epstein’s test allows a plaintiff to survive summary judgment by
providing evidence that a payment, made solely to a target executive, was
conditioned on the success of the tender offer.158 However, if Katt’s suggestions are
taken, a plaintiff would also have to show that the payment provided was intended to
induce the target executive to tender his or her shares. This is a difficult threshold,
especially during the summary judgment stage when the plaintiff has not had the
opportunity for discovery. Katt’s new standards thus remove much of the force
plaintiffs originally wielded under Epstein.
Nevertheless, Katt makes one valid and important point: A payment made
pursuant to an agreement negotiated between the target company and its executives
does not violate the best price rule. This allows a bidder to avoid expending
unnecessary time and money in litigation by showing that it was not involved in
negotiating the agreements. The best price rule was not intended to cover such
agreements. Rather, it was intended to prevent a more prominent situation: the
coercive, two-tier tender offer.159
The best price provision also prevents additional payments to one
shareholder that exceed the payment to any other shareholder as long as the
payments are pursuant to the tender offer. One example of this is the payment of a
156

Id.

157

Id.

Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir. 1995). Note that the plaintiff must still prove that
the compensation provided to the target executive was more than that provided to other shareholders
to succeed. Id. at 654. The additional consideration must also be shown to have been pursuant to the
tender offer. Id.

158

159 113 CONG. REC. 854, 856 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) (noting that his proposed rule
“would outlaw tender offers on a first-come, first-served basis and [would] thus eliminat[e] pressure
on shareholders to make hasty deposits”); see also supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
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bonus to target executives under an agreement negotiated between the acquiring
corporation and the executives. For instance, the Wasserman transaction in Epstein
involved negotiations between the acquiring company and target executives. 160
Under the Katt standard, a court would probably find that this agreement violates the
best price rule because it took place during the tender offer. However, if the target
company and its executives negotiated the agreements independently, Katt would
uphold the agreements as a matter of law. As such, the Court alleviates a substantial
burden on the acquiring company and allows it to legitimately takeover another
company’s existing agreements.
However, the debate is still wide open. After Katt, two tests remain, one of
which is broad and mutable, and the other of which is rigid. Courts are still left with
the discretion to decide which is correct, with little guidance because the phrase
“during the tender offer” has still not been defined. Meanwhile, investors are still at
a loss because both tests seem to reject their needs, especially if other circuits
adopting the Epstein test also heed Katt’s additional considerations. Due to judicial
inconsistencies, either the SEC or Congress must make a proper resolution to the
best-price debate.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the diversity of the individuals and parties involved in best-price cases,
resolution of this matter is difficult and requires a careful balancing of all interests.
Senator Williams noted this much when he recognized “that the administrative
approach of neutrality in the regulation of proxy contests…would also be
appropriate for tender offer regulation.”161 As such, this section will proceed with a
brief discussion of the important issues involved in regulating tender offers. It will
then argue that defining the term “tender offer” is an unnecessary task with respect
to best-price litigation. Rather, it will discuss the usefulness of defining the phrase
“during the tender offer” and will propose a definition. Finally, it will recommend
that a safe harbor provision is necessary to fulfill the interests of all involved and will
suggest provisions for consideration.

160

Epstein, 50 F.3d at 647-48.

161 See Tyson, supra note 89, at 251; see also 113 CONG. REC. 854, 855 (1967) (statement of Sen.
Williams).
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A. Issues Involved with Regulating Tender Offers
The regulation of tender offers was intended to cover the smallest period of
time possible, thereby allowing 162 and encouraging 163 private or open market
transactions outside of the tender offer period. Three things are important to note
here. First, privately negotiated transactions were occurring at the time Senator
Williams was considering his bill. Second, the Senator did not want private
transactions disclosed until after they occurred so as to maintain and encourage
private negotiations. Third, he did not object to the occurrence of private
negotiations. As a result, an overarching policy of protecting the tender offer
process should be taken into consideration when regulating tender offers. Tender
offers serve as useful tools to promote efficiency and growth. 164 Commentators
argue that “competition among managerial teams for the rights to manage resources
limits divergence from shareholder wealth maximization by managers and provides
the mechanism through which economies of scale or other synergies available from
combining or reorganizing control and management of corporate resources are
realized.” 165 As such, acquiring corporations need to know what is legal before
making a tender offer in order to sustain the benefits of the process. Otherwise, the
courts could jeopardize the whole process, as some have argued in referring to the
Ninth Circuit’s broad Integral Part Test.166
B. The Irrelevance of Defining a Tender Offer
The Ninth Circuit noted in Epstein that courts have been forced to create a
functional test because neither Congress nor the SEC has defined the term “tender
offer.”167 The test has been necessary, according to the Ninth Circuit, because it
113 CONG. REC. 854, 856 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) (stating that “[s]ubstantial open
market or privately negotiated purchases of shares may precede or accompany a tender offer”).
162

Id. (“While some people might say that this information [private purchases] should be filed before
the securities are acquired, disclosure after the transaction avoids upsetting the free and open auction
market where buyer and seller normally do not disclose the extent of their interest”).

163

164

See Tyson, supra note 89, at 251 n.48.

165

Jensen & Ruback, supra note 90, at 6.

166

See Austin & Anand supra note 83, at 10.

167

Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir. 1995).
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scrutinizes private transactions “‘in the context of various salient characteristics of
tender offers.’” 168 However, defining a tender offer will accomplish little for
purposes of Rule 14d-10 because a tender offer still begins on the date set by Rule
14d-2. Regardless of the definition, an acquiror must file forms with the SEC only
when he intends to purchase a block of shares from the target corporation. The
Seventh Circuit argues that the purpose of Rule 14d-10 “is to demark clearly the
periods during which the special Williams Act rules apply.”169 Because the Act is
filled with disclosure requirements that a bidder must file once the offer commences,
a court would “wreak havoc” by declaring that the tender offer actually began before
the general announcement date.170
On the other hand, proponents of the Ninth Circuit’s rule might argue that
defining a tender offer would lead to the clearest results of what “during” means
because courts would have assistance in determining what transactions are included
in the tender offer. This would lead to clearer results than leaving the definition
open and the duration fixed. By defining the term “tender offer,” bidders would
know what they could and could not do before disclosing their intent to make a
tender offer to the public under Rule 14d-2. This would be clearer for all parties
involved and would be more protective of investors.
However, the difficulty involved in defining a tender offer is that transactions
surrounding the tender offer period are numerous and varied. Some transactions
involve paying bonuses to managers, while others involve fulfilling pre-existing
golden parachute agreements. Any workable definition of a tender offer could not
enumerate all of the possible agreements and would thus run the risk of being too
narrow. In fact, the conventional definition of a tender offer, a “publicly made
invitation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares for
sale at a specified price,” 171 has always been seen by commentators as being too
narrow.172 Although one might broaden that definition by defining the tender offer
168

Id. (quoting Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 943-44 (2d Cir. 1988)).

169

Lerro v. Quaker Oats, 84 F.3d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1996).

Id. at 246. Rule 14d-2 requires a bidder to file documents with the SEC upon commencing a
tender offer. According to the rule, the tender offer commences on the date of general
announcement. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (2005). However, if a court could potentially determine that
the commencement date should have been before the general announcement date, then a bidder
would not know when to file the required disclosures.

170

171

Developing Meaning, supra note 8, at 1251.

See id. at 1271 (“[A]ny attempt to return to [the conventional definition] would be unrealistic in
view of the growing number of authorities taking a more expansive approach”).
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as including all transactions that accompany the conventional tender offer, this
would burden and stifle many transactions that surround the time of a tender offer.
Additionally, it would deter corporations from making tender offers in the first place
because potential bidders would be fearful that a court would later deem transactions
surrounding the tender as part of the tender offer. As a result, any definition of a
tender offer would accomplish little in this context, and defining the term becomes
tangential to this debate with the real issue centering on when the tender offer
actually occurs.173
C. ‘When’ the Tender Offer Occurs
The two competing interpretations of the best price rule dispute when the
tender offer period actually begins. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit
rejected any test that examined only those transactions that occurred after the official
commencement of the tender offer period under Rule 14d-2(a).174 Consequently, the
Court implicitly acknowledged that a tender offer can potentially begin before the
tender offer is publicly announced.
Given the sharp divide among the circuits175 and the dichotomous nature of
the split, either Congress or the SEC should clarify the meaning of “during the
tender offer” because “[t]he difference between ‘during’ and ‘before’ (or ‘after’) is
not just linguistic.” 176 Courts give great deference to the language in securities
statutes and regulations. 177 Thus, an SEC pronouncement could end the current
debate.
For purposes of clarity and as a matter of administrative and judicial
convenience, the SEC should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s Bright-Line Rule when
defining the phrase “during the tender offer.” Even if the Ninth Circuit’s flexible
173

See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 654 (9th Cir. 1995).

The Seventh and Eleventh circuits have both adopted the bright line test; whereas the Second,
Third, Sixth, and Ninth circuits have adopted the fact intensive, integral part test.
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Lerro, 84 F.3d at 243.

177 See id. (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995); Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,
511 U.S. 164 (1994)) (noting that these cases “tell us to respect the language of securities statutes and
regulations”).
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and mutable standard were limited solely to best-price cases, its rule is still too
indefinite to create workable and consistent results. If the tender offer period were
dependent on the facts of each case, courts and corporations would still have no
guidance in determining what transactions are permitted around the time of a tender
offer. Any negotiation or transaction could potentially be recognized as violating the
best-price rule, even if the bidder’s intentions were to comply with the rule.178 In
addition, the Supreme Court has noted that “the 1934 [Securities Exchange] Act
cannot be read ‘more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably
permit.’” 179 The Ninth Circuit’s test, in leaving so much open to judicial
determination, may be too expansive to be acceptable under this pronouncement.
Additionally, the Williams Act sets forth a number of disclosure and filing
requirements that a bidding corporation must fulfill in order to commence a tender
offer.180 If the commencement date of each tender offer remained unknown until
determined by the courts, then a bidder would be unable to comply with the
disclosure requirements of the Act. Furthermore, an unclear line regarding the
commencement of a tender offer would inhibit open market and privately negotiated
transactions. Senator Williams went to great lengths to ensure the stability and
integrity of the open market by not unduly impeding private interests.181 The Senator
noted in his address to Congress that “[t]his bill…regulates [the] ‘taking up’ of shares
pursuant to a tender offer.” 182 Moreover, it is generally recognized that “open
178 This is so given Epstein’s acceptance of conditional transactions as a proxy for an intention to
induce target executives to tender. However, bidders constantly make conditional offers. It is a
matter of business sense that an acquiring corporation condition its contracts on the success of a
tender offer because otherwise, it would be wasting assets.

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980) (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 578 (1979)).
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See, e.g,. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-3(a), 240.14d-6 (2005).
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See 113 CONG. REC. 854, 856 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams):
To avoid hindering casual acquisitions which are not substantial, I propose an
exemption from these reporting requirements for any acquisition or proposed
acquisition which…does not exceed 2 percent of the outstanding shares. I am also
including a provision giving the SEC authority to exempt any transaction if
the…transaction will not change or influence the control of the issuer.

See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a) (2005) (exempting acquisitions of less than five
percent from the disclosure requirements of a tender offer).
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market purchases made without advance publicity of the buyer’s intent are generally
not tender offers.”183 As such, the Rule was not meant to regulate or impede all
transactions, just those that occur during the tender offer.
The SEC should adopt a bright-line rule with respect to the commencement
of a tender offer. This rule would define “during” in the literal sense, only covering
transactions that occur after the commencement of the tender offer and through its
end. This rule would also resolve the conflict in a clear manner, consistent with the
disclosure and filing requirements set forth in the other provisions of the Act.
Additionally, it would protect the integrity of the open market by not impeding
casual transactions. Katt stated that,
“With millions or even billions of dollars at stake, precise definition
of the [offer] period is essential, and the SEC has accordingly
consistently differentiated actions ‘during’ an offer from those close
to the offer’s beginning or end. The line is arbitrary…but some line
is essential, and it had best be a bright one.”184
However, because there are two stated purposes to the Williams Act, namely
investor protection and clarity, and because the Act attempted to be neutral in its
application, any definition could bias the application of the rule.185 The bright-line
rule, as stated before, may compromise the investor protection purpose of the Act in
favor of clarity. Thus, in conjunction with this definition, Congress should enact a
safe harbor provision in order to better protect investors, thereby making the
application of the bright-line rule more neutral.
D. Safe Harbor
Any safe harbor provision should address two main issues: management
capture and procuring a reasonable price per share for investors that is not reduced
because of collusion between the acquirer and target executives. Although both
issues are interrelated, the former concerns target executives who support the tender
183

EDWARD N. GADSBY, FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 § 7A.03 (2004)

Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 841, 854 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (quoting Lerro v.
Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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185 For instance, adopting the Seventh Circuit’s Bright Line Rule would endorse the clarity purposes of
the Act at the expense of investor protection. Likewise, accepting the Ninth Circuit’s definition
would compromise the clarity envisioned by Senator Williams in favor of investor protection.
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offer solely because of self-dealing. The concern is that they might not be acting in
stockholders’ best interests with respect to the acquisition. The latter issue is partly
what the Williams Act intended to address. By creating new disclosure requirements,
the Act attempted to make stockholders more informed so that they could make a
better tendering decision. But the Act was also meant to secure an unvarying price
per share for all investors so that none could be coerced into tendering. Collusion
between target executives and the acquiring company that results in bonus payments
to executives may reduce the compensation given to non-insider investors. A safe
harbor provision should remedy these situations without unduly impeding the
market for acquiring companies.
One scholar has suggested applying a safe harbor provision when the bidder
values the target before entering into employment or incentive agreements.186 This
would create a “floor” for the tender offer, thereby protecting the valued price per
share from being “cannibalized” by “employment and incentive payments to target
insiders.” 187 However, savvy bidders could take into account any anticipated
agreements and value the company lower than it otherwise might have. Effectively,
the “floor” created would be lower than it should have been. Another alternative
would be to provide “general guidelines governing the employment and incentive
agreements.” 188 For instance, apply the safe harbor provision when the bidder
increases the number of stock options by no more than a certain percentage of
existing options, or when the bidder increases compensation or performance
bonuses by no more than a certain percentage of current compensation.189 Although
such regulations are helpful, they do not address the main aim of the best-price rule,
which is to secure a uniform price per share for all investors.
Such
recommendations serve only to limit the amount that target executives can receive
above and beyond the tender offer price.
To accomplish the goal of ensuring that shareholders receive the best price
for their stock, the safe harbor provision could apply when managers procure or
attempt to obtain more than one bid for their company. Although the best-price
rule does not currently apply to target executives, the actions of these executives are
integral to the tender offer process. As a result, the safe harbor provision should
structure their actions. This provision would provide shareholders with a reasonable
186

See Fleming, supra note 36, at 293.
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estimate of the value of their shares. Under current law, target executives do not
have an incentive to find multiple bidders. In fact, many executives might refuse to
solicit additional bids for their company because of a contractual obligation to
support one company’s attempt to acquire the corporation. This safe harbor
provision would discourage those agreements and also provide target shareholders
with a reasonable estimate of their shares. For instance, in Katt, the target company
and its investment banker contacted over forty potential bidders, with five
companies submitting preliminary bids for the target company.190 The defendant,
UTC, offered the highest price per share, 191 which suggests that its offer was
relatively reasonable and fair for all shareholders. Such a process would ensure that
shareholders remain reasonably informed about the potential premium they should
expect.
The safe harbor provision could also apply when managers disclose
reasonable counterarguments and opposition to an attempted takeover. The original
purpose of the Williams Act was to protect investors by informing them about the
specifics of the tender offer.192 Additionally, Senator Williams recognized that “full
disclosure is not an impediment, but an aid, to legitimate business transactions.”193
However, thus far, Congress has only required disclosures from the bidding
company. 194 Applying the safe harbor provision when management voices
reasonable opposition to the tender offer will give shareholders a better description
of the full effects of the tender offer, thereby helping them to make an informed
decision.
Furthermore, the safe harbor provision could apply when the bidder
discloses to the target investors the substance of all agreements it negotiated with
target executives. Many of these bonus agreements are made to persuade target
management to support the tender offer so that they will in turn solicit investors’
support. However, the safe harbor would diminish the coerciveness of these
agreements because shareholders might be more skeptical about agreeing with the
executives if they know that the executives have been paid to support the acquisition.
190
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Finally, the safe harbor provision could protect certain types of agreements.
For instance, it could exempt agreements enacted independently of the bidder.
Golden parachute agreements are frequently the subject of best-price litigation.195
However, there are legitimate and important business reasons for having golden
parachutes, namely obtaining and retaining quality management. 196 As such,
Congress should encourage corporations to enact these agreements by reducing
liability in tender offers. Moreover, the Williams act was not meant to cover these
agreements; they are not a form of additional compensation for shares that Senator
Williams intended to remedy. The senator’s concern was to prevent coercive twotiered tender offers which would pressure “shareholders to make hasty deposits.”197
Essentially, he intended to ensure that all who tendered would receive the same
compensation. Golden parachute agreements, on the other hand, are a form of
executive compensation for work performed, not for shares tendered. As a result, by
exempting these contracts, Congress would help reduce best-price litigation and
remove “undue obstacles in the way of honest and fairly conducted transactions.”198
Another type of agreement that the safe harbor provision could exempt is an
unconditional agreement to pay target management for work performed around the
time of a tender offer. Although one would wonder why a bidder would
“contemplate making payments to a target’s executives…unless the bidder succeeded
in acquiring the company,” 199 a bidder’s irrevocable promise to pay would signal
good faith on its part rather than an attempt to capture target executives. If the
bidder were really paying the executives for assisting in the tender offer, then the
payment made should not be conditioned upon the tender offer’s success because
the executives performed the work that they contracted to do. However, there are
issues of double payment because executives had a pre-existing duty and were paid
to work for their company. A bidder’s bonus payment is thus meaningless in this
context. The safe harbor provision might limit the frequency of these payments by
signaling to bidders that conditional agreements will be scrutinized.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Clarity is essential to maintaining an efficient market. With so much at stake,
uncertainty impedes even the legitimate acquirors’ actions. The Williams Act, in
promoting the dual and dichotomous goals of investor protection and clarity, is
difficult to interpret. Focusing on one purpose of the Act necessarily compromises
the other to some extent. When interpreted under the broad policy of neutrality
(that is, maintaining the importance of both purposes equally), cases become almost
impossible to decide without hurting one class of litigants. This is why courts like
the Ninth Circuit devise tests that are entirely fact dependent. However, these tests
have caused more confusion than they have alleviated. As a result, many welladvised companies are shying away from tender offers in favor of other mechanisms
for acquiring companies. Alternatively, some companies have used tender offers to
facilitate a subsequent merger by structuring a two-tier offer that concludes with a
short-form merger. Whether this trend is beneficial to shareholders and companies
in the long run is unknown. However, research suggests that target shareholders
gain in both tender offers and mergers,200 whereas shareholders of a bidding firm
only gain value when their firm conducts a tender offer. 201 Ultimately, however,
Congress or the SEC will need to address this ambiguity and the market’s reaction.
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